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NOTES 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND THE DUTY TO REMOVE DANGER 
• As a general principle the criminal law does not impose sanctions for 
failures to act, preferring to confine liability to acts (l)~ Thus, to draw on 
the time-honoured example, nd liability attaches to the able-bodied adult 
who stands by and watches a helpless infant drown in a shallow pool; 
indeed, the idle adult is permitted a malicious ,~in with impunity.' Several 
reasons may be advanced for this preference~irst, whilst it is relatively 
easy to define the prohibited occurrence in terms of an act, it becomes 
more difficult to define such occurrence in terms of a failure to act (2). 
In short, criminal omissions can lead to problems of vagueness. Related 
to this is the problem of identifying those who are, or ought to be, liable. 
Recourse to the principles of causation is of limited assistance, as, in one 
sense, we all failed to prevent the evil against which the sanction is 
directed. Thus, some factor other than causation must be incorporated 
into the rule which makes an omission criminal. The rule punishing in-
action must define its scope, ~-p'mething which is necessarily implicit in 
the rule which punishes action'~econd, it is generally felt that the func-
tion of the criminal law is to prohibit the doing of wrong, not to require 
the doing of good. To require good of a person who merely wishes to 
be left alone is seen as being unnecessarily burdensome. That task is 
delegated to other normative systems, such as morals, social mores, or 
etiquette. In the law the Bad Man is no less noble or virtuous than the 
Good Samaritan (3). . 
To this general principle there are, however, exceptions. First, certain 
common law offences are defined purely in terms of omissions, the most 
(I) See generally, Hughes, "Criminal Omissions" (1958) 67 Yale L.J. 590; Glazebrook, 
"Criminal Omissions: the Duty Requirement in Offences Against the Person" (1960) 
76 L.Q.R. 386; Robin'"son, "Criminal Liability for Omissions: a Brief Summar:t and 
Critique of the Law in the United States" (1984) 29 N. Y. U.L.J. 101; Glanville 
Williams, Textbook oj Criminal Law (London, 1982), pp. 148-153; Smith and Hogan, 
Criminal Law (London, 1983), pp. 43-47. 
(2) It should be noted that in some cases an occurrence is ambiguous and it is difficult to 
label it as being either an act or an omission. Acts and omissions do not form discrete 
categories and the boundaries might overlap. Determining the nature of the occurrence 
will depend on the perspective adopted. An example is provided by the recent decision 
in Kaitamaki v. The Queen [1980] I N.Z.L.R. 59, [1984] 2 All E.R. 435, where the 
appellant was held to be guilty of rape in circumstances in which he honestly believed 
the prosecutrix to be consenting at the moment of penetration but where during inter-
Course he realised that consent was absent. Had he desisted at that latter stage he would 
not have been convicted. His persistence can be viewed either as an act of intercourse 
or as an omission to desist. However, this note is not concerned with that issue and 
it assumes the acts and omissions are readily identifiable. 
(3) An interesting exception arises in Vermont where a general duty to rescue has been 
created by statute; see Franklin, "Vermont Requires Rescue; a Comment" (1972) 25 
Stan. L. Rev. 51. 
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notable being misprision of felony (4). Second, there is the growing 
category of statutory offences which impose liability for failing to do a 
particular act. Familiar examples are driving a motor car without 
insurance (5), operating unfenced machinery (6), or selling liquor without 
a licence (7). Whilst each of these offences contains an element of action, 
liability is imposed by reason of the element of omission. The prohibited 
occurrence is not having insurance or a licence, or not guarding the 
machinery. The act committed, namely driving or selling, is in itself 
criminally neutral. Its criminal character is derived from its being a sur-
rounding circumstance of liability; it is the context in which liability 
arises. ~ 
Greater difficulty is experienced with those Qffences which normally 
consist of acts but which can be committed by omission. Including an 
omission within the scope of such an offence normally rests on the 
recognition of and enforcement in the criminal context of a duty to act 
in the circumstances proven. The decisions in this area have been 
primarily, but not exclusively, concerned with homicides. There is, 
however, no reason in principle why they should not apply to other 
offences (8). A word of caution must be expressed with respect to 
statutory offences. Where the statutory language is in terms which sug-
gest action the courts would be reluctant to extend lia~lity to an omis-
sion (9). Thus, "wounding" has connotations of action which would 
exclude an omission. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a case of 
wounding by omission. However, if in this respect the language is neutral 
omissions could give rise to liability. 
As stated, liability for an omission normally rests on the existence, 
or judicial creation, of a duty which will be imposed by the criminal law. 
The point can be taken further in that it can be said that if liability is 
imposed for an omission a duty to act is thereby created. Thus, whilst 
no duty to release a dog in pain had previously been recognised the con-
sequence of Green v. Cross (10) has been to create such a duty. However, 
the more common approach has been to determine whether a duty exists 
and then to consider whether a failure to act was a culpable breach of 
that duty. The courts have been innovative in their creation of duties, 
excising them both from the civil law generally and from contract. 
Parents have been held to be under a duty to act to prevent the death of 
(4) Misprision of treason is now a statutory offence: Treason Act, 1939, s.3. It had been 
thought that misprision of felony had fallen into abeyance until the House of Lords 
resurrected the offence in Sykes v. D.P.P. [1962] A.C. 528. A contrasting decision is 
that in Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309 (1979). 
(5) Road Traffic Act, 1961, s.56. 
(6) Safety in Industry Act, 1955, ss. 23 and 100. 
(7) Intoxicating Liquor (General) Act 1924, s.7. 
(8) See Smith, [1982] Crim. L.R. 773; see contra Glanville Williams, Textbook o/Criminal 
Law, p . 151. 
(9) Powell v. Knight (1878) 38 L.T.R. 607; see contra Green v. Cross (1910) 26 T .L.R. 507 
(Channell J. dissenting). 
(10) (1910) 26 T.L.R. 507. 
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their children (11). Doctors who have undertaken to treat a patient are 
under a duty to prevent that patient's death (12). However, consistent 
with the approach that the law does not require the altruism of the Good 
Samaritan, the duty is owed only to the child or patient; the parent need 
not act to save a neighbour's child nor need the doctor act to save one 
who is not a patient. A ship's captain is under a duty to make all 
reasonable efforts to rescue those of his passengers or crew who have 
fallen overboard (13), and certain persons who have a public duty are 
liable in respect of prohibited harm arising from their negle~t (14). Apart 
from duties which arise in respect of well-defined relationships the courts 
have been prepared to hold that in particular circumstances the accused 
by his or her conduc~ had assumed a duty to act (15). The parent who 
starves his or her child to death can easily be considered to be guilty of 
either murder or manslaug\lter. However, where lesser injuries result, 
problems of mens rea aside, it might be difficult to find an appropriate 
offence. Could the parent be said to have caused grievous bodily harm 
or to have committed an assault occasioning actual bodily harm? The 
difficulty of construing statutory words of action to include inaction 
must be borne in mind. Nor will the common law offences of assault and 
battery necessarily have been constituted. The starving infant might not 
have been put in fear of suffering a battery and the deprivation of food 
could, only with difficulty, be considered to amount to an application of 
force (16). Moreover, in R v. Dytham (17) the police officer was liable, 
(11) R. v. Gibbons and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 134. 
(12) The liability of medical practitioners is fully treated by Benyon, "Doctors as 
Murderers" [1982) Crim. L.R. 17. An interesting opinion was ventured by Macnaghten 
J. in R. v. Bourne (1939) I K.B. 687, where he suggested that a doctor who refused 
to terminate a pregnancy, which threatened the life of a patient, would be guilty of 
manslaughter by negligence, if as a result the patient dies. This in effect means that 
the doctor would be under a duty to terminate. If the doctor intentionally refused to 
perform that operation, could he or she be convicted of murder? 
(13) U.S. v. Knowles (1864) Fed. Cas. 801. 
(14) See R. v. Curtis (1885) 15 Cox C.C. 746; R. v. Pitt wood (1902) 19 T.L.R. 37; R. v. 
Dytham [1979) Q.B. 772. In Leigh v. Gladstone (1909) 26 T.L.R. 139 a prison 
officer's duty to protect the life and health of a prisoner was held to justify the forced 
feeding of the prisoner. Would the officer be liable for taking a decision not to force 
feed? The officer's duty was considered in a different context in The State (C.) v. 
Frawley [1976) I.R. 366. In Buckoke v. Greater London Council (1971)2 All E.R. 254 
an instruction to firemen to ignore traffic signals, when answering emergency calls, if 
it was safe to do so was held to be lawful. Are firemen under a duty (apart from their 
contractual duty of obedience) to ignore traffic signals in such circumstances? 
(15) The cases have concerned a variety of relationships and the duty has normally been 
held to have arisen in respect of helpless or infirm persons. See R. v. Nicholls (1874) 
13 Cox C.C. 75; R. v. Instan (1893)1 Q.B. 450; R. v. Chattaway (1922) 17 Cr. App. 
R. 7; R. v. Stone and Dobinson (1977) Q.B. 354; R. v. Smith (1979) Crim. L.R. 251. 
(16) The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Williams (1984) 78 Cr. App . R. 276 
is of interest in this context. Although the issue of omissions did not arise Lord Lane, 
in the course of his judlWlent, stated: "[O)ne starts off with the meaning of the word 
'assault'. 'Assault' in the context of this case, that is using the word as a convenient 
abbreviation for assault and battery, is an act by which the defendant, intentionally 
or recklessly, applies unlawful force to the complainant". 
(/7) [1979) Q.B. 772. 
94 The Irish Jurist, 1984 
not in respect of the injuries suffered by the person to whose aid he omit-
ted to go, but for the separate offence of misconduct in public office. 
These problems, however, stem from the definitions of the particular 
offences which constitute the code of non-fatal offences against the per-
son and not from any deficiency in the law's concept of a duty. 
Only in rare cases has the law imposed a duty to act when a danger 
has been created. One such case was the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Henderson v. Kibbe (18). There the accused, who had 
robbed an intoxicated man and left him stranded on an unlit road, later 
to be run over and killed by a truck, was held to be guilty of second 
degree murder (19). Although the decision concerned the adequacy of the 
triai judge's direction on the issue of causation, implicit in his conviction 
is that the accused was under a duty to remove the deceased from his 
dangerous location. The duty in that case arose as a consequence of the 
accused's having created the danger in circumstances which were 
criminal. Nothing in the decision suggests that had the danger been 
created innocently the acc~ would have been under a duty to act, 
much less that a passive bystander would have been under such a duty. 
In Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (20) the Divisional Court 
held that the accused who inadvertently drove his car onto a constable's 
foot and subsequently, in the knowledge of this, refused to move it was 
guilty of assault of a police officer in the execution of his duty (21). The 
decision was based on the view that the entire incident was a continuous 
act which constituted the actus reus of the offence charged, rather than 
on any duty imposed on the accused. Thus the court avoided the issue 
of attaching liability to an omission and the associated problem of 
discovering a duty which had been neglected. The closest any court has 
come to attributing liability to a failure to remove an innocently created 
danger was in the Massachusetts decision of Commonwealth v. Cali (22). 
There a direction that a person who accidentally starts a fire and, having 
formed the requisite intent, takes no steps to extinguish it could be guilty· 
of arson was upheld; it was sufficient that the intent was formed after 
the ignition of the fire if the accused was in a position to take steps to 
extinguish it. Although the point was not expressly stated the inference 
is that the accused was, in the circumstances, under a duty to act. 
Developing a duty to remove danger 
It is against this background that the English courts had recently to 
(18) 431 U.S. 145 (1977). 
(19) The offence of second degree murder is committed where a person recklessly engages 
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person and thereby causes 
the death of another person; New York Penal Law § 125.25(2). 
(20) [1969] 1 Q.B. 439, [1968] 3 All E.R. 442. In Kaitamaki the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal decided the case on the point that sexual intercourse is a continuing act which 
can be accompanied by mens rea formed after the commencement of the act, [1980] 
1 N.Z.L.R. 59. 
(21) Contrary to s.51 of the Police Act, 1964. 
(22) 247 Mass. 20 (1923). 
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consider the case of R. v. Miller (23). The facts were straightforward and 
not in dispute. The appellant, a squatter, lit a cigarette whilst in bed and 
subsequently fell asleep. The bed caught fire, thereby awaking the 
appellant. He moved to an adjoining room, resumed his slumbers, and 
ignored the fire. 'Ihe fire spread through the house and, somewhat unfor-
tunately for the appellant, he was rescued; His conviction of arson was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, in turn. The 
Court of Appeal accepted the general proposition that, in the absence of 
specific statutory provision or a common law duty imposed in the 
criminal context, an omission ought not to attract criminal liability. 
Moreover, the court stressed that normally the actus reus and the mens 
rea must coincide (24). However, certain offences occupy a long period 
of time and in respect of such offences an actus....reus can be UUned...by". 
a previous or subsequent mens- rea to-complet~he-- ofiene . In such 
-cases reality and common sense dictate that --'lD-UIlintentional act 
Coupled with an intentional omission should be ~ed as..constitutiniL 
in toto anIntentional act (25). Fagan was one such case, and in Miller the 
condUct of fhe appeIfant from the moment of ignition to the burning of 
the house could be regarded as one act; by his failure to act the appellant 
adopted the earlier act of ignition (26). Given that at the time he failed 
to act the appellant had formed the necessary mens rea (27), his convic-
tion was sound. Implicit in the Court of Appeal's judgment was a reluc-
tance to sever into elements of act and omission a course of conduct 
which may be regarded as being unitary and involving action. 
The House of Lords upheld the Court of Appeal. Lord Diplock, in 
a speech which enjoyed the concurrence of his brethren, adopted Gor-
don's classification of offences as being conduct-crimes or result-
crimes (28), and noted that arson is of the latter category. The question 
Which should be asked is whether the appellant did an act which caused 
the fire. If the answer is in the affirmative all of the appellant's conduct 
from just before the moment of ignition until the completion of the 
damage is relevant; so too is the state of mind throughout the episode. 
Both the conduct and the state of mind might vary during this period. 
(23) [1982] 3 All E.R. 386, [1983] 1 All E.R. 978. 
(24) [1982] 3 All E.R. 386, 391. 
(25) Ibid. 
(26) Ibid., 393. 
(27) Both courts held that recklessness, as defined in R. v. Caldwell [1981]1 All E.R. 961, 
constituted sufficient mens rea for the offence of arson. It is by no means certain that 
the Irish courts would accept Caldwell recklessness as being sufficient and, in this 
respect, Miller might not be followed in Ireland. However, that does not detract from 
the main theme of this note. 
(28) [1983]1 All E.R. 978, 980. Gordon defines a result-crime as being one, the actus reus 
of which is separable in time and/or place from the criminal conduct creating it and 
Where the law is interested only in the result and not the causative conduct. In 
conduct-crimes the criminal conduct and the actus reus are inseparable and the nature 
of the conduct is an essential element of the actus reus. The Criminal Law oj Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1978), p. 63. 
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There is no ground for excluding liability if at the time of any piece of 
conduct the appellant acquired the necessary mens rea to constitute the 
offence. Nor is there any ground for excluding from conduct capable of 
giving rise to liability, conduct which consists of failing to act to prevent 
a danger created by the appellant, provided that at the time the necessary 
mens rea was present (29). Lord Diplock adverted to the different 
theories (30) advanced to explain the decision and indicated his support 
for the duty theory for the ease of explanation to the jury. However, he , 
would prefer the term "responsibility" to "duty" (31) . 
Quite clearly the House of Lords acknowledged that the appellant 
was under a duty to act, neglect of which duty, coupled with mens rea, 
gave rise to liability. The House considered the appellant's failure to 
take measures to extinguish the fire to be an omission. That omission 
did not deter the House from attributing liability to the appellant as he 
had been under a duty to act!The scope of the duty was indicated by the 
House. It arises where, before the prohibited result is achieved, an 
accused has become aware of the danger which he or she has creat~ and 
it lies within his or her powers to take steps to negative that dangemThe 
terms employed in outlining this duty would indicate a willingness to 
apply it to result-crimes generally. Thus, the person who accidentally 
knocks a young child into the shallow pool would be guilty of homicide 
if, having become aware of what has happened, he or she, with mens rea, 
refuses to effect a rescue and the child dies. The element of causation 
defines those on whom the duty is imposed; thus, only those who create 
the danger are bound to act, thereby absolving the passive bystander. 
Normally this will require an initial act, but significance is attached to the 
failure to act once the danger has been created; an accused is held to be 
liable, not on account of the creation of the danger, but because, having 
created the danger, he or she failed to act. The creation of the danger 
by an accused is the context in which the duty arises. That context differs 
from those of other duties to act which have been recognised. Normally 
duties to act arise from a particular relationship or an assumption of 
responsibility by an accused, rather than from something done by the 
accused, albeit inadvertently. However, the relationship, the assumption 
of responsibility, and the creation of the danger are legal equivalents. 
Several questions arise from the decision in Miller. As the appellant 
did nothing, it was unnecessary to consider the standard of behaviour 
which is required to satisfy the duty. Presumably all that would be 
required is that reasonable steps be taken (32). Although this introduces 
(29) [1983] I All E .R. 978, 98l. 
(30) Ibid., 983. The theories are considered infra, pp. 97-99. 
(31) Ibid. 
(32) By analogy the duty of the ship's captain is to take all reasonable measures to effect 
a rescue; see U.S. v. Knowles, note 13 supra; and a police officer is required to take 
reasonable measures to assist the victim of a criminal attack; see Dytham, note 14 
supra. 
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an element of uncertainty into the law, reasonableness is a concept with 
which the courts are familiar in the criminal, as well as the civil, context. 
Relevant factors would include the presence of fire-extinguishing 
apparatus and the availability (and condition) of a telephone to contact 
the fire brigade. Thus, to an extent at least each case would depend on 
its own facts. A further question is whether the duty would arise where 
the initial causative act is not merely innocent but is justifiable. Does an 
accused who shoots an attacker in circumstances which would give rise 
to a defence of self-defence have a duty to procure assistance for the 
attacker who, being injured, no longer poses a threat? As formulated by 
the House of Lo~ds the accused wo~ be under such a duty; the accused 
has caused the danger, is aware of it, and is in a position to act. A related 
question arises in regard to cases where the accused is under a different 
duty and performance of both duties is impossible. Should a policeman 
who shoots one of two armed felons, whom he has been chasing, aban-
don his pursuit of the other in order to procure assistance for the 
first (33)? To an extent the answers to the latter questions will depend on 
the policy which underlies the duty. The House of Lor.ds did not indicate 
what that policy is, other than stating that no sensible system of law 
ought to absolve anyone in the position of the appellant ·of liability (34). 
It does not necessarily follow that such a system would attribute liability 
to the victim of a criminal attack or the policeman in pursuit of felons. 
~e answer to that must await further clarification. 
Duty to act or continuing act? 
Commentators have differed in their analysis of the decision, par-
ticularly with respect to its underlying theory (35). It has been argued 
that the Court of Appeal decision,involved a legal fiction, namely, deem-
ing acts to be intentional when in fact they were not, and that in reality 
the appellant's conviction was based on his omission to extinguish the 
fire which he started (36). On this theory the appellant's guilt could only 
be based on a failure to act, in circumstances in which a duty arose, 
COupled with mens rea in that regard. Thus, there is no necessity to 
attribute fault to the initial causative act (37). As stated, this theory 
found favour with the House of Lords. The argument in reply, which 
supports the Court of Appeal's approach, involves an acceptance of the 
proposition that, in result-crimes, mens rea conceived after the act, but 
before the occurrence of the prohibited result, can lead to liability; if 
(33) A possible answer is that a policeman enjoys a discretion in the exercise of his powers. 
It would be permissible for him to assist the injured felon, thereby abandoning his 
pursuit of the other; see R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn 
[1968] 2 Q.B. 118. But would a decision to persist in the chase and to neglect the 
injured felon be permissible? 
(34) [1983]1 All E.R. 978, 982. 
(35) Smith [1982] Crim. L.R. 527, 773; Glanville Williams [1982] Crim. L.R. 773 . (36) Smith, op. cit. 
(37) Ibid. 
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mens rea is present before the result occurs and if that result is the conse-
quence of the act combined with the accused's decision not to prevent 
it, liability is established, provided that the accused's conduct falls within 
the scope of the offence (38)~The difference rests on the view taken of 
the events which occurred. The duty theorist considers the act to have been 
completed on the ignition of the mattress. Anything which happened 
subsequently, at least in regard to the actus reus of arson, was an omis-
sion. The acts of leaving the room and ignoring the conflagration were , 
omissions. The continuing act theorist looks at the episode as a whole 
from the moment of ignition to the completion of the result, namely the 
occurrence of a sufficient degree of burning to constitute the actus reus 
of arson. Thus considered, what occurred was an act and not an omis-
sion; Miller burnt the house, he did not merely fail to save itlJhis theory 
recognises that result-crimes may be committed by a variety of acts over 
a period of time and that until the result occurs-f,nything done in respect 
of it, and which is causative in nature, is an act.:JThe mens rea in respect 
of the result adopts the prohibited conduct and liability is thereby 
established. This theory avoids the difficulty which might be associated 
with the creation by the courts of duties to act where none previously 
existed and the associated difficulty of ascertaining the extent of the 
duty. Moreover, by adhering to the traditional approach it provides a 
rationale for absolving the passive bystander of liability; causation in the 
active sense is an element of culpability and the bystander has not met 
that requirement. 
In defence of the duty theory it has been argUed~hat the decision did 
not involve the creation of liability for an omissi n without statutory 
authority. Drawing on the analogy of the decision i R. v. Gibbons and 
Proctor (39), it has been argued that if withholding fo~afrom a child until 
it dies is "killing", then failing to extinguish a fire can ~ount to burning. 
Thus, Gibbons and Proctor could have been convicted of causing 
grievous bodily harm had the child survived, but with serious injuries. 
No difficulty is seen in extending this approach to offences involving 
"damaging", "destroying", "wounding", and "assaulting" (40)~ 
However, the caution expressed earlier with regard to construing words 
of action to include omissions (41) must be reiterated. Nor does the duty 
theory explain why liability is confined to those whose initial acts caused 
the prohibited result to occur. The theory sees causation not as an 
element of culpability but as the context in which the duty to act arises. 
Given that view of the factor of causation, there appears to be little 
reason why a duty should be imposed on the causer of the danger and 
not on the passerby, who might be as well-, if not better, placed to take 
measures to remove it. 
(38) Glanville Williams, op. cit. 
(39) (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 134. 
(40) Smith, op. cit. 
(4/) Supra, p. 92. 
Notes 99 
A further distinction between the two theories lies in the attitude 
towards attributing criminal liability to omissions. The continuing act 
theory is based, in part at least, on a reluctance to attribute liability 
whereas the duty theorist feels no such inhibition. The respective deci-
sions in Miller reflect this difference in attitude. The Court of Appeal 
accepted as being general the proposition that liability for omissions 
should not attach in the absence of explicit statutory provision or a 
recognised duty enforceable in the criminal context (42). In contrast, 
Lord Diplock felt that there was no difficulty in attaching liability, as the 
question was simply one of statutory construction in the light of the 
general principles of criminal law (43). Thus, a provision which is neutral 
in terms can, if appropriate, be in~rpreted to include Omissions. 
Inasmuch as it suggested a preclusion of liability for omissions, his lord-
ship expressed a willingness to discard the term "actus reus" and to 
substitute for it a more neutral "conduct of the accused" (44). This must 
amount to the strongest indication yet from a common law court of a 
readiness to abandon what was assumed to be a reluctance to interpret 
.offences to include liability for omissions . Although the Lords did not 
consider the position of common law offences, theicreliance on what 
they regarded to be the general principles of criminal law would suggest 
that there is no reason why the approach in Miller should not apply 
generally. Indeed, Dytham (45) is an example of a common law offence 
which was committed by means of an omission. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be stated that Miller has created a duty to 
remove danger created by the accused. This duty applies to the offence 
of arson and, presumably, to all result-crimes. It arises in respect of 
those offences because the law is principally concerned with prohibiting 
a certain result and not with the species of conduct which brings about 
that result. The imposition of the duty depends on the accused's having 
created a danger which causes)he prohibited result. The duty is not 
imposed on a passive bystan~r and the position still is that the law does 
not require the standards of the Good Samaritan. 
More generally Miller marks a point where a common law court has 
shed the traditional reluctance to attribute liability to an omission. It 
could be the first in a series of cases in which offences, which are neutral 
in terms, are interpreted to include liability for omissions. This would 
involve the creation of new duties to act in the relevant circumstances. 
The possibility is that the general proposition stated at the start of this 
(42) [1982] 3 All E.R. 386, 392. 
(43) [1983]1 All E.R . 978, 980. 
(44) Ibid. , 983 . 
(45) [1979] Q.B. 772. 
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note will have to be revised and that instead the proposition will become 
that there is no liability for an omission where the prohibition is defined 
in terms which preclude such liability. 
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